A New Phase in Unlicensed Generation: The Amendments of 2 April 2026

Significant regulatory changes directly affecting the unlicensed generation regime have been introduced through the Regulation on Amendments to the Regulation on Unlicensed Electricity Generation in the Electricity Market (the “Amending Regulation”), published in the Official Gazette dated 2 April 2026 and numbered 33212. Through these amendments, numerous provisions of the Regulation on Unlicensed Electricity Generation in the Electricity Market (the “Regulation”) have been revised.

The amendments introduced in the Regulation may be interpreted not merely as limited revisions addressing specific technical issues, but rather as a set of measures that simultaneously affect different layers of the unlicensed generation regime and, in certain respects, reshape its overall framework. For this reason, it appears important that these amendments be assessed not only based on individual provisions, but also through a holistic approach that considers the interactions between the relevant articles.

ARTICLE 4 – Definitions

With the amendments introduced under this Article, the scope of the definition of “relevant network operator” has been expanded. It is now explicitly stipulated that not only TEİAŞ and distribution companies, but also legal entities holding Organized Industrial Zone (“OSB”) distribution licenses and Industrial Zone (“EB”) distribution licenses shall be considered within this scope. This amendment may be regarded as enabling unlicensed generation practices to be addressed in a more holistic manner across different network structures.

Furthermore, defining the concept of “netting” based on an hourly time interval establishes the conceptual foundation for the transition to the hourly netting system introduced in the subsequent provisions of the Regulation. This may be seen as pointing towards a structure that allows for a more precise and real-time monitoring of the balance between generation and consumption.

With the introduction of the definition of the “relevant period,” it appears that a clearer framework has been established for determining the start and end of non-compliance periods. This, in turn, may be considered as providing the administration with a more defined reference interval in the implementation of sanctions.

Finally, the addition of the definition of “industrial zone” may be interpreted as a regulatory step aimed at positioning large-scale and organized production areas more explicitly within the unlicensed generation regime.

ARTICLE 5 – Exemption from Licensing and Company Incorporation

The amendments introduced under Article 5 may, at first glance, be regarded as an approach that enhances the flexibility of establishment within the unlicensed generation regime. However, when the relevant provisions are read in conjunction with other articles, it appears that such flexibility is redefined within certain boundaries.

First, allowing the establishment of more than one renewable energy-based generation facility for the same consumption facility may be considered as a regulatory step that enables technical diversification within the unlicensed generation model. This approach may provide certain advantages in terms of enabling the combined use of different generation technologies, balancing the generation profile, and allowing for resource-based optimization.

It may also be observed that the previously explicit total installed capacity limit has been removed from the text. However, it may become clearer in practice whether this limitation continues to exist indirectly through system connection capacity, technical evaluation processes, and other relevant provisions. In this respect, the amendment may be interpreted as an attempt by the regulator to grant a certain degree of technical flexibility to investors, while at the same time preserving control mechanisms in terms of system capacity and overall balance.

That said, interpreting this amendment solely as a liberalization may be insufficient. On the contrary, when considered together with the netting regime, limitations on surplus energy, and the mechanisms governing contributions provided without consideration set out in other provisions, it may be argued that the flexibility introduced at the installation stage is balanced by different mechanisms at the operational stage. Within this framework, the arrangements introduced under the fourth paragraph may be seen not as having a purely investor-favouring effect, but rather as requiring repositioning within the overall architecture of the system.

With respect to micro cogeneration facilities, it appears that the limitation allowing only one facility per consumption facility has been maintained. This may indicate that, rather than expanding micro cogeneration investments, the existing limited framework continues to be preserved. This approach may be considered as reflecting a preference to keep the role of micro cogeneration within the system under a controlled scope.

ARTICLE 7 – Connection Principles

The amendments introduced under Article 7 appear to aim at establishing a more comprehensive and multi-layered framework regarding the connection structure within the unlicensed generation regime, as well as the investor–network relationship. It may be considered that these arrangements, while expanding technical access opportunities to a certain extent on the one hand, also exhibit a dual character that strengthens control mechanisms relating to system security, capacity management, and application discipline on the other.

One of the notable aspects is that certain generation facilities are allowed to be connected to the grid not only through the existing distribution network, but also via distribution assets to be established by the applicant. This approach may be regarded as having been designed as a tool that could facilitate investments, particularly in regions where capacity constraints exist. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that this possibility may give rise to additional infrastructure costs for investors and may exert additional pressure on financial feasibility.

In addition, for certain generation facility applications to be connected at the transmission level, as well as for applications to be connected to the distribution system with feeder allocation, it is understood that the completion of provisional acceptance of the infrastructure elements related to the connection point (such as transformer substations, distribution centres, and energy transmission lines) is introduced as a precondition for specific types of applications. It may be considered that this arrangement is not limited to establishing a threshold aimed at increasing the level of technical readiness, but also effectively creates a distinction between different application categories by excluding generation facilities for which a joint connection opinion has been established from this connection regime. In this context, the regulation may be regarded as functioning as a filtering mechanism aimed at eliminating speculative applications or projects with limited feasibility that are encountered in practice.

The arrangements introduced for generation facilities with an installed capacity of 10 MW and above are also noteworthy. Within this framework, while direct connection to substations is allowed for generation facilities seeking connection to the transmission system, feeder allocation appears to be made possible for applications to be connected to the distribution system. This regulation may be interpreted as aiming to establish a more direct and predictable connection framework, particularly for large-scale projects.

Another significant amendment under this Article is the clarification of the processes relating to technical modifications to be made at generation facilities. In this context, it appears that the obligation for the generation facility owner to apply to the relevant network operator and obtain approval for changes such as DC/AC capacity adjustments, protection scheme modifications, and similar technical revisions has been maintained. On the other hand, for applications based on geothermal, biomass, wind, and solar energy, a more explicit mechanism appears to have been established for conducting the technical evaluation process through EİGM and YEPDİS. In this respect, the amendment may be interpreted not as introducing an entirely new obligation, but rather as expanding the scope of the existing permit and technical evaluation mechanism and rendering it more systematic.

This expansion of scope may be considered as aiming to enable a more holistic assessment of the technical impacts of different generation technologies. That said, given that the impacts of different resource types on the grid may vary, it may also be noted that, in practice, technical evaluation processes are likely to evolve into a clearer framework over time, in conjunction with administrative practices.

When assessed overall, the amendments introduced under Article 7 may be seen as reflecting an approach that, on the one hand, expands connection opportunities to a certain extent, and on the other hand, makes control mechanisms relating to system security, capacity management, and application discipline more visible and effective. This dual approach may be considered as serving to steer the unlicensed generation regime towards a more controlled structure, one that is technically more predictable and administratively more manageable. Nevertheless, it should also be considered that the practical implications of these arrangements will likely become clearer over time, particularly through administrative practices that will emerge in relation to technical evaluation processes and connection allocations.

ARTICLE 10 – Prohibition of Duplicate Applications

The eighth paragraph added to Article 10 introduces an explicit limitation regarding the handling of applications submitted by the same person for the same location within application processes. In the first part of the provision, it appears that submitting a new application by the same person for the same location before the previous application has been finalized is prohibited. This provision may be considered as aiming to prevent strategies occasionally observed in practice, such as capacity blocking or securing the same capacity through different variations. Accordingly, it may be interpreted that the regulator seeks to establish a more transparent and competitive structure within application processes.

At the same time, the second sentence of the paragraph clarifies that, in the event of withdrawal from an application, a subsequent application to be submitted will not be considered as a duplicate application. This approach appears to provide a certain degree of flexibility to the applicant; for instance, in cases where the applicant may need to withdraw from the initial application due to technical, financial, or site selection considerations, it prevents the process from being entirely closed off for the same applicant. In this respect, the regulation may be seen as seeking, on the one hand, to limit potential abuse of the system, while on the other hand, to preserve a reasonable margin of manoeuvre for applicants.

When assessed in general terms, it may be suggested that this paragraph aims to ensure a more disciplined conduct of application processes, to reduce repetitive and simultaneous demands for the same capacity, and to render evaluation processes more predictable. However, in practice, the interpretation of the concepts of “same location” and “duplicate application” may give rise to the need for further assessment, particularly in cases involving sites that are geographically proximate yet may be considered technically distinct.

ARTICLE 11 – Facilities Eligible to Apply

Within the scope of the amendments introduced to Article 11 of the Regulation, the repeal of the second paragraph may, at first glance, appear to constitute a technical simplification. However, it also carries substantive implications that may directly affect certain investment models in practice. The repealed paragraph had defined a specific application area within the unlicensed generation regime, particularly for consumption facilities belonging to public institutions, as well as wastewater and drinking water treatment facilities and facilities established for agricultural irrigation purposes and had provided certain flexibilities for these facilities that went beyond the general framework.

When the repealed provision is examined, it is understood that, for these types of facilities, the establishment of a generation facility was permitted, provided that the contractual capacity under the connection agreement was not exceeded, and on parcels forming an integrated whole, in such a way that the generation and consumption facilities would be located at the same metering point. In this respect, the paragraph allowed for a partial departure from the individual consumption–individual generation matching principle that forms the basis of the unlicensed generation model, and enabled broader-scale and, to some extent, collective consumption structures to be supplied through a single generation facility. It was possible to consider agricultural irrigation unions, infrastructure facilities affiliated with municipalities, and similar structures within this scope.

In practice, this arrangement may be considered as having paved the way for the development of certain investment models that could be characterized as “semi-centralized” within the unlicensed generation regime. Indeed, although technically remaining within the scope of unlicensed generation, such structures could, in terms of their economic scale and organizational form, go beyond conventional self-consumption projects and give rise to outcomes that, to a certain extent, resembled the licensed generation model. This provided a notable facilitation, especially in projects where there was a need to balance consumption spread over a wide area through a single generation facility.

In this context, the repeal of the second paragraph primarily results in the removal of this specific application area. In other words, it appears that the separate application and installation opportunities previously defined for these facility types are no longer available, and that such facilities will henceforth need to be evaluated within the general provisions of the unlicensed generation regime. This development may lead to certain configurations and structures that were previously possible for these facilities being addressed in a more limited manner going forward.

In particular, the removal of the flexibility provided through the concepts of “same metering point” and “integrated parcels” may be regarded as a development that could make it more difficult to associate large-scale and dispersed consumption structures with a single generation facility. In this respect, the amendment may be considered as potentially narrowing technically feasible connection and metering configurations and requiring certain investment models to be restructured. As a matter of fact, such flexibilities had, in practice, been capable of playing a critical role, particularly in large-scale irrigation and infrastructure projects.

At the same time, the amendment may also be interpreted as having a constraining effect on the use of the unlicensed generation model for collective or semi-commercial purposes. With the repeal of the relevant paragraph, the approach allowing multiple consumption elements to be supplied through a single generation facility may be subject to a more limited interpretation, and it may be suggested that there is a tendency for the system to revert towards a more individual self-consumption axis. This may, in turn, give rise to new constraints in practice, particularly for cooperative-type structures or consumption models involving multiple users.

From a regulatory perspective, it should not be disregarded that this amendment may have been driven by concerns that the unlicensed generation model has, over time, expanded and acquired certain commercial characteristics. It may be considered that allowing larger-scale generation structures through technical concepts such as metering points and parcel integrity could lead to a departure from the fundamental purpose of the unlicensed generation regime. In this context, the amendment may have been introduced with the aim of reducing exceptional applications and establishing a more uniform implementation framework.

From an investor perspective, however, it appears that the effects of this amendment may vary depending on the type of project. For agricultural irrigation projects, municipal infrastructure investments, and collective consumption structures, the amendment may give rise to more pronounced consequences, whereas it may be expected to have a more limited impact on conventional rooftop-type self-consumption projects. In this respect, the amendment may be seen as having the potential to reshape the areas of use of the unlicensed generation model and to narrow them in certain segments.

In conclusion, the repeal of the second paragraph under Article 11 may be regarded, beyond a legislative simplification, as a regulatory change indicating a shift towards a narrower and more individualized structure in terms of the scope and application area of the unlicensed generation model. This amendment may give rise to new interpretation and implementation needs, particularly with respect to public infrastructure and collective consumption models, and its practical implications may become clearer over time through secondary regulations or administrative practices.

ARTICLE 12 – Commission Structure

With the regulation introduced regarding the formation of the commission, it appears that a specific commission model has been envisaged for OSB and EB structures.

This may be considered as enabling decision-making processes to be shaped in a manner that is more aligned with local and specific conditions.

ARTICLE 14 – Technical Evaluation

When the amendments introduced under the third paragraph of Article 14 are assessed together, it appears that the technical evaluation process has evolved towards a more systematic and connection point-oriented approach, particularly in terms of how applications are handled.

First, the addition to the text regarding the evaluation of applications indicates that the core axis of technical review has been explicitly defined as the connection point. Through this addition, it may be stated that a clearer framework has been established whereby applications are to be evaluated not solely on an individual project basis, but also collectively where they share the same connection infrastructure. This approach may be considered as aiming to enable a more rational allocation of capacity, particularly in regions where grid constraints are significant. Following the amendment, rather than applications being assessed entirely on an individual basis, it may be interpreted that a stronger emphasis is placed on joint evaluation and interaction among applications directed to the same connection point.

This amendment is likely to gain particular importance in practice in cases where many applications are directed to the same substation or connection line. Whereas under the previous framework the independence of each application was more clearly preserved, it may be considered that the new arrangement creates a basis for indirect competition or prioritization among applications. This may, in turn, give rise to new discussions in practice regarding which applications will be prioritized or how they will be grouped in cases of capacity constraints.

On the other hand, the fact that the technical evaluation will continue to be carried out in accordance with the Regulation and the relevant technical legislation, considering metering and protection systems as well as grid constraints, indicates that the main framework has been preserved. This may suggest that, rather than establishing an entirely new system, the regulator has preferred to reposition the existing structure around the connection point.

In conclusion, the amendments introduced under Article 14/3 may be regarded as indicating a shift from an “independence-based” evaluation of applications towards a “connection point-based holistic evaluation” approach. It may be considered that this shift could give rise to new outcomes in practice, particularly in terms of capacity allocation and the interaction between applications. Nevertheless, how this approach will be implemented in practice and how it will affect the balance between applications may become clearer over time through implementation examples.

ARTICLE 17 – Connection Agreement

The amendments introduced under Article 17 may be considered as indicating that the approach to time management and completion discipline in unlicensed generation projects has been reshaped. Although the changes may appear limited at first glance, they may be interpreted as aiming to re-establish the balance between flexibility in the investment process and administrative control.

First, the repeal of subparagraph (c) of Article 17/2 concerning environmental impact processes may be regarded as indicating that the relationship between permitting processes and the investment timeline has been redefined. Under the previous framework, environmental impact assessment procedures could, in certain cases, provide flexibility to investors in terms of time calculations. With the removal of this provision, it may be considered that the impact of environmental permitting processes on the investment schedule has become more direct and that these processes no longer constitute a separate protective layer in terms of time management. This development may increase time pressure on investors in projects where environmental permitting processes are prolonged.

In addition, the complete repeal of the third paragraph stands out as one of the most notable amendments under this Article. Under the previous regulation, it had been possible, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, to grant an additional 180-day period to the investment timeline. The removal of this possibility in its entirety indicates that the flexibility regarding time extensions in unlicensed generation projects has been significantly limited. This amendment may be considered as aiming to encourage investors to carry out project planning within a more predictable and disciplined framework.

However, the elimination of such flexibility may also give rise to certain challenges in practice, particularly considering that investment processes are not always entirely within the control of the investor. In cases when factors such as supply chain disruptions, financing processes, administrative permits, or site conditions may affect project timelines, the absence of a time extension mechanism may increase risks for investors. In this respect, the amendment may be interpreted not only as a discipline-enhancing measure, but also as a factor that redistributes risk in a manner that may not necessarily be in favour of the investor.

Another notable aspect within the scope of this Article is the addition of the phrase “except for wind energy-based generation facilities” to the seventh paragraph. This addition is significant in that it indicates a differentiation between different resource types within the unlicensed generation regime. Considering that wind energy-based facilities may be subject to different technical, administrative, or installation processes compared to other generation facilities, it appears that a distinct approach has been adopted for such facilities.

Through this arrangement, it may be considered that a more stringent or restrictive implementation is envisaged for generation facilities other than wind, while a certain degree of flexibility may have been preserved for wind projects. This may suggest that, particularly for solar energy projects, a stricter regime in terms of time and obligations could be applicable. Accordingly, it may be stated that the amendment reflects not only a general tightening, but also an approach that incorporates differentiation based on resource type.

When assessed overall, the amendments introduced under Article 17 may be regarded as aiming to establish a more rigid and predictable structure for time management in unlicensed generation projects. At the same time, by narrowing the scope of flexibility available to investors, they may be considered as introducing a framework that requires a higher level of planning discipline in project development processes. The practical

implications of these changes may become more clearly observable particularly in projects requiring time extensions and in the differentiated applications that may arise across different resource types.

ARTICLE 19 – Investment Period and Acceptance

When the amendments introduced under Article 19 are assessed as a whole, it may be observed that an effort has been made to establish a clearer, more measurable, and implementation-oriented framework in terms of the investment process of generation facilities, the acceptance mechanism, and capacity management.

First, the removal of the phrase “without prejudice to the provision of the seventh paragraph of Article 30” draws attention. Given that Article 30/7 has been repealed, the removal of this reference may be interpreted as indicating that the timeframes and obligations under Article 19 are no longer limited by an explicit exception referring to another provision, and that the rule has therefore been rendered more independent and directly applicable. This development may be considered as aiming to strengthen consistency of interpretation in practice by reducing complex cross-references between different articles.

In addition, the removal of the phrase “permits relating to technical interaction approval and water usage rights” from the text indicates that the set of permits considered during the investment process has been narrowed. This amendment may be seen as aiming to establish a simpler framework, particularly with respect to permits linked to the completion timeline of generation facilities. However, whether such permits have been entirely excluded from the scope or will be addressed under other regulatory frameworks appears to be a matter that will require further assessment in practice.

The provision added to the Article is particularly significant in terms of clarifying the technical thresholds related to the partial acceptance mechanism. Accordingly, it is explicitly regulated that, where the remaining capacity after partial acceptance is below 10 MWe, acceptance may be granted for this remaining portion. This approach may be regarded as enabling the separate evaluation of relatively small remaining capacity portions following partial acceptance, thereby facilitating the completion of the investment. In this way, a certain degree of flexibility is granted to investors, while at the same time ensuring that the system progresses through more meaningful and manageable capacity blocks from an operational perspective.

Furthermore, while the existing approach under which, in the event that the capacity outside the accepted portion is not commissioned within the prescribed period, the connection agreement is updated on the basis of the accepted portion, is maintained, it may be considered that, with the newly introduced threshold, this process has been rendered more predictable.

When assessed in general terms, the amendments introduced under Article 19 may be interpreted as simplifying the structure of permits and exceptions relating to investment processes, subjecting the partial acceptance mechanism to clearer rules, and aiming to establish a more disciplined structure in terms of capacity management. Nevertheless, it should also be considered that the practical implications of the removed references and the regulatory framework under which certain permitting processes will be followed may become clearer over time through implementation practices.

ARTICLE 23 – Surplus Energy

With the amendment introduced under Article 23, it appears that the scope of the provision has been redefined, particularly in relation to facilities that became entitled to receive a connection agreement call letter prior to 12/5/2019. The revision of the title of the Article to explicitly refer to this date may be interpreted as indicating that the provision, rather than constituting a general rule of application, establishes a specific regime tailored to a particular group of investors.

Within this framework, it is explicitly regulated that the netting operations of the relevant facilities will be carried out on an hourly basis by the relevant network operator. It may be understood that this aims to eliminate uncertainties regarding the measurement and netting period that may have been subject to discussion under previous practices. The adoption of an hourly netting approach may be considered as enabling a more precise and real-time monitoring of the balance between generation and consumption, and, in this respect, as contributing to a more controlled structure in terms of system operation.

At the same time, for investors who obtained rights prior to the date, it appears that the possibility for energy that cannot be consumed at the generation facility to be used at other consumption facilities belonging to the same person within the same distribution region continues to be preserved. This may be regarded as an approach aimed at maintaining the economic feasibility of investments made in earlier periods.

When assessed in general terms, it may be stated that the amendment, on the one hand, defines the rights and obligations of a specific group of investors more clearly, and, on the other hand, aims to increase uniformity in practice by placing the netting mechanism on a more technical and measurable basis.

It may also be considered that the amendments introduced under this Article are of a nature that could have an impact on the fundamental logic of the unlicensed generation model.

ARTICLE 24 – Evaluation of Surplus Energy

With the amendment introduced under Article 24, it appears that the scope of the provision has been explicitly limited to facilities that became entitled to receive a connection agreement call letter prior to 12/5/2019. The revision made in the title of the Article may be interpreted as indicating that the provision has been transformed from a general rule of application into a specific regime tailored to a particular group of investors. In this respect, it may be stated that a clearer distinction has been established between investments made in the previous period and new investments.

In terms of content, it is observed that the provisions previously included in the regulation, which stipulated that surplus energy supplied to the grid would, in certain cases, be considered as contribution provided without consideration to YEKDEM, have been removed from the text. One of the most significant implications of this removal, from the perspective of investors, may be the reduction of the risk that surplus energy would be entirely transferred to the system without compensation. Accordingly, it may be considered that the amendment reflects a more balanced approach aimed at limiting economic losses for facilities established in earlier periods.

At the same time, removing detailed provisions on cases where the origin of energy supplied to the grid from different generation facilities cannot be determined may be interpreted as an effort to simplify complex scenarios encountered in practice. This may also indicate an intention to reduce technical and commercial calculation difficulties, particularly in multi-facility structures.

When assessed in general terms, it may be stated that the amendments introduced under Article 24, on the one hand, more clearly define a specific regime applicable to past investments, and, on the other hand, aim to establish a more predictable structure by simplifying certain mechanisms related to the evaluation of surplus energy that previously gave rise to complex and, at times, investor-adverse outcomes.

ARTICLE 25 – Payment Mechanism

With the amendment introduced under Article 25, it appears that the scope of the provision has been explicitly limited to facilities that became entitled to receive a connection agreement call letter prior to 12/5/2019. This narrowing approach, similar to that observed in the preceding articles, indicates that a separate payment and netting regime specific to a particular group of investors has been established. In this respect, it may be considered that the regulation aims to address the financial flows of investments made in earlier periods.

Another noteworthy aspect in terms of content is the updating of the provisions referenced in the calculation of payments. In the previous regulation, the reference made to Article 24/4 has been revised to point to the third paragraph in the new regulation, which may be interpreted as an update aligned with the systematic amendments introduced under Article 24. This change appears to redefine the scope and method by which surplus energy will be procured and reflects an effort to ensure consistency across the provisions.

At the same time, the newly introduced provision requires that payments made by the market operator to the designated supplier company be transferred to producers within a very short period (within three business days). This may be evaluated as a measure in favour of investors in terms of cash flow management. Furthermore, the obligation to notify the Authority as to whether such payments have been completed indicates that a control mechanism has been established to enable closer monitoring of payment processes.

On the other hand, the additional provision regarding the sanctions applicable in the event of default by the designated supplier company indicates that the enforcement mechanism has been strengthened. In this respect, it is not limited to the application of default interest, rather it is explicitly regulated that proceedings will also be carried out within the scope of the Balancing and Settlement Regulation. This indicates that, in cases where payment obligations are not fulfilled, a more comprehensive and multi-layered sanction regime is envisaged.

In general terms, the amendments introduced under Article 25 may be considered to establish, on the one hand, a specific payment regime by limiting the scope to a particular group of investors and, on the other hand, to adopt an approach that accelerates payment processes and strengthens the sanction mechanism. In this respect, the regulation may be seen as aiming to create a more predictable structure, particularly in terms of the financial sustainability and collection security of past unlicensed generation investments.

ARTICLE 26 – Netting Regime

A review of the regulatory framework governing unlicensed electricity generation suggests that, particularly following the recent amendments, the netting mechanism has moved beyond its former role as a purely technical calculation tool and has been repositioned within a broader structure that directly influences market functioning. In this context, the framework appears to redefine the relationship between generation and consumption, reshape the economic treatment of surplus energy, and clarify the allocation of roles among market participants. From this perspective, it may be inferred that, rather than departing from the core logic of the unlicensed generation model, the regulation seeks to guide it toward a more controlled, more transparent, and more bounded structure.

One of the clearest manifestations of this shift lies in the technical restructuring of the netting concept itself. Under the previous regime, netting was largely conducted on an invoice basis through distribution companies and designated supplier companies. Under the revised framework, however, the system appears to transition toward a centralized and more systematic calculation model based on hourly metering data. When considered alongside elements such as the transmission of metering data to the market operator, the execution of calculations within the Market Management System, and the systematic recording of data, it may be stated that netting has been placed on a more centralized and standardized footing compared to prior practice.

As a natural extension of this structure, the functional distinction between the grid operator and the market operator also appears to have been recalibrated. The role of the grid operator seems to be largely confined to the collection and transmission of metering data, whereas calculation and netting processes are consolidated under the responsibility of the market operator.

The adoption of an hourly netting methodology carries particular significance for the technical operation of the system. Matching generation and consumption on an hourly basis reduce the degree of flexibility that previously existed under monthly balancing practices and enables the system to be balanced over shorter time intervals. This shift may produce different outcomes, particularly for facilities where generation and consumption profiles are not aligned and may render intra-day imbalances between generation and consumption more visible.

A further notable aspect of the regulation concerns its treatment of surplus energy arising after netting. When the relevant provisions are considered as a whole, it appears that, although such energy falls within the scope of YEKDEM, no payment is made to the producer. Instead, this energy is deemed to be generated by the designated supplier company and is treated as a contribution to YEKDEM provided without consideration. In this sense, it may be considered that this approach could significantly limit the ability of unlicensed generation facilities to derive revenue from excess production and may lead to production decisions being more closely aligned with consumption needs.

More broadly, the regulation appears to define the generation–consumption relationship through a more restrictive set of parameters. The limitation of generation capacity to the consumption of the relevant consumption facility, the introduction of annual upper limits on generation, and the removal of the economic value of surplus energy where such limits are exceeded may suggest that unlicensed generation is being positioned primarily as a consumption-support mechanism. In this regard, the system may be seen as evolving toward a structure that prioritizes meeting consumption needs rather than facilitating commercial gains from surplus production.

This approach is also reflected in the rules governing annual generation limits. Linking generation amounts to prior-year consumption, introducing alternative calculation methods where sufficient data is unavailable, and treating surplus energy as a contribution provided without consideration where limits are exceeded all indicate that the system is designed not only to regulate instantaneous netting but also to control overall generation volumes. From this perspective, it may be considered that the regulation incorporates a mechanism that indirectly constrains the scale of unlicensed generation facilities.

At the same time, the regulation appears to allow for a certain degree of geographical flexibility. The possibility for generation and consumption facilities to be in different distribution regions or within the territories of different designated supplier companies may be viewed as an element that enhances flexibility. However, given that netting calculations are carried out by the market operator and that all relevant data is consolidated within a centralized system, it may be considered that this geographical flexibility is effectively balanced by centralized control mechanisms.

The provisions governing payment processes further reinforce this integrated structure. The fact that calculations are performed by the market operator, that the designated supplier company is responsible for executing payments, and that such payments are subject to defined timelines may be intended to render financial flows more standardized and traceable. The systematic recording of data and the execution of processes within clearly defined schedules may also be seen as elements that complete the technical infrastructure of this framework.

Taken together, these elements suggest that the unlicensed generation model is evolving toward a more centralized, data-driven, and tightly structured system. This transformation does not appear to eliminate unlicensed generation as such, rather it may be understood as an effort to situate the model within a more controlled framework, while significantly narrowing the scope for revenue generation from surplus production. Accordingly, it may be considered that the regulation positions unlicensed generation not as an investment or commercial production model, but predominantly as a mechanism to support consumption.

That said, the practical implications of this regulatory approach, particularly in relation to hourly netting, the treatment of contributions provided without consideration, and the application of annual generation limits may become clearer over time, depending on how these elements shape market behaviour. In this respect, it may be noted that the evolution of the system warrants close and continued monitoring.

ARTICLE 27 – Objections

Although the amendment introduced under Article 27 may appear limited at first glance, it indicates a significant expansion in terms of the actor structure of the system. The addition of the phrase “or aggregator” expands the scope of the objection mechanism beyond being limited solely to the designated supplier company and brings the activities carried out by aggregators directly within the objection regime.

With this amendment, in relation to the transactions carried out under Articles 23, 24, 25, and 26, the counterparty of producers will no longer be limited to the designated supplier company but may also include the aggregator. Accordingly, the right granted to producers to file objections within three business days may now also be exercised against transactions carried out by aggregators. This may suggest that the aggregation activity, which has become increasingly visible in recent market design, is being incorporated not only operationally but also explicitly within the sphere of legal responsibility and oversight.

Furthermore, with the parallel amendment introduced in the second paragraph, it appears that the obligation to review and conclude objections has also been extended to aggregators alongside the designated supplier company. Accordingly, aggregators will now be required to examine objections directed to them within five business days, make corrections where necessary, and notify the outcome to the relevant party. In this context, the role of aggregators is no longer limited to portfolio management or balancing functions but is evolving into that of a market participant assuming active responsibility within objection processes.

In conclusion, it may be considered that this addition strengthens the position of the aggregation model within the regulatory framework and establishes aggregators as direct counterparts to producers. That said, the way this relationship will be shaped in practice, particularly in terms of the content of producer–aggregator agreements and the operation of objection procedures may become clearer over time.

ARTICLE 28 – Consumption Facilities

With the amendment introduced to the first paragraph of Article 28, a new calculation methodology appears to have been established for allocating post-netting consumption in cases where a single generation facility is associated with multiple consumption facilities. Accordingly, where total consumption exceeds total generation following the netting process carried out under Article 26, the resulting post-netting consumption is distributed among the associated consumption facilities on a tariff basis, considering their respective pre-netting consumption ratios. This approach may be understood as aiming to ensure that the outcomes of netting are allocated in a more predictable and structured manner, particularly in configurations involving multiple consumption points.

The continuation of the provision suggests that, for facilities that obtained a call letter prior to 12 May 2019, a framework has been introduced in which the significance of differences between subscriber groups is reduced. In this context, it becomes possible to associate multiple consumption facilities regardless of whether they fall within the same subscriber group. However, during the netting process, generation is assumed to be consumed first at consumption points with lower tariffs. While this structure may offer greater flexibility in associating facilities, it may also be interpreted as introducing a “lowest tariff first” principle, which could limit opportunities for economic optimization.

Another notable amendment concerns the treatment of internal consumption in cases where generation and consumption facilities are not located at the same metering point. Under the revised framework, internal consumption arising from equipment operating within the generation facility site is included in the netting calculation by being attributed to the associated consumption facilities. However, where no such associated consumption facility exists within the same region, this internal consumption is invoiced by the designated supplier company based on the applicable tariff. This approach may be viewed as seeking to prevent on-site technical consumption from remaining outside the system and to ensure consistency based on measurable data.

Subsequent provisions indicate that the relationship between generation and consumption facilities has been structured with greater flexibility through user and subscription arrangements, which may in turn allow for broader association with different consumption facilities. At the same time, these processes are clearly subject to defined timelines and procedural requirements. Provided that all required documentation is duly submitted, applications submitted by the last business day of each month are expected to be processed on the same day. In parallel, the fact that surplus energy calculations resulting from these arrangements are to be carried out by the market operator points to a model in which both the technical and financial aspects of the process are brought within a centralized framework. This may be understood as an effort to ensure greater consistency in implementation.

Another amendment expands the scope of sanctions applicable in cases of unlawful electricity consumption. Rather than limiting the assessment to the relevant consumption point, a proportional calculation is now undertaken by considering all associated consumption facilities. Furthermore, even where a portion of the energy generated during a given period is deemed to have been supplied to the system, no payment is made for such energy, instead, it is treated as a contribution provided without consideration to YEKDEM. This framework may be interpreted as strengthening the control mechanisms within the system.

A similar approach appears to apply in cases where consumption does not occur. Except in situations of force majeure, where no electricity consumption is realized at the associated consumption facilities, the generated energy is deemed to have been supplied

to the system without any corresponding payment. In this respect, the regulation may be understood as reinforcing the “consumption-oriented” nature of the unlicensed generation model and requiring a tangible linkage between generation and actual consumption.

In a related provision, it is expressly stipulated that all consumption facilities must be in active consumption status as of the acceptance date of the generation facility. Where consumption has not yet commenced, any energy generated during this period is again treated as a contribution provided without consideration to the system. This approach suggests that greater attention may need to be given to the timing of consumption in project development processes and that investment planning could be directly affected as a result.

Further provisions elaborate on the determination of surplus energy pricing across different subscriber groups. While a high-tier tariff is taken as the reference for residential subscriber groups, different tariff combinations may apply for public institutions and other low-voltage groups. This differentiation may be seen as an attempt to establish a more nuanced pricing mechanism aligned with consumption characteristics. However, it should also be noted that it may introduce additional complexity in calculations, particularly in structures involving multiple subscriber groups.

Finally, a specific rule has been introduced for determining surplus energy prices in portfolios that include consumption facilities connected at both high-voltage and low-voltage levels. Under this rule, the lowest active energy unit price among the relevant consumption facilities is taken as the basis. This approach may be interpreted as aiming to limit revenue optimization based on more advantageous tariff structures within a portfolio and to reflect a more conservative pricing methodology.

When considered as a whole, the amendments may be viewed as aiming to make the system more disciplined, measurable, and less susceptible to misuse, while at the same time narrowing areas that had previously allowed for more flexible interpretation in favour of investors. In this context, it may be possible to conclude that the framework brings the unlicensed generation regime closer to a model based on “consumption-linked generation.”

ARTICLE 29 – Consolidation of Consumption Measured by a Common Meter

Although the amendments introduced under Article 29 may appear limited in scope at first glance, they may be considered to signal a certain direction in terms of the systematic positioning of the regulation and the allocation of responsibilities. In this context, the change in the title of the article, together with the addition of the term “market operator” to the third paragraph, should be assessed in conjunction.

Firstly, the revision of the article title to “Consolidation of Consumption Measured by a Common Meter” may be interpreted as reflecting the regulator’s intention to define the scope of this provision more clearly. Compared to the previous, more general wording of “consumption consolidation,” the new title directly focuses on consumption measured through a common meter, thus, it may be considered that the types of technical configurations to which this provision applies are set out in a more explicit manner. This approach may also be viewed as aiming to reduce uncertainties that could arise in practice among different consumption consolidation models.

In addition, the inclusion of the term “market operator” in the third paragraph does not appear to expand the range of parties to which disputes arising from consumption consolidation may be directed, rather, it introduces a limitation in this respect. Indeed, while the relevant provision emphasizes that such disputes should be resolved among the parties themselves, it also explicitly excludes not only the network operator and the designated supplier company but also the market operator from being a party to such disputes. This amendment may be interpreted as a clear reflection of an approach under which the role of the market operator is intended to be confined to technical and operational functions.

Within this framework, it may be considered that the regulator more explicitly sets out that the market operator whose role has increased particularly in netting and data processing processes, should not be the addressee of disputes arising from private law relationships between the parties. Accordingly, in structures involving multiple parties, particularly within the scope of consumption consolidation, a framework appears to be reinforced in which the resolution of potential disputes is left to contractual relationships between the parties rather than to administrative bodies or market infrastructure actors.

ARTICLE 30 – Applications Related to Consumption Needs

The amendments introduced under Article 30 appear to indicate a certain shift in approach, particularly with respect to the conditions governing the establishment of the relationship between generation facilities and consumption facilities, as well as the process for commissioning such facilities. When the additions and removed provisions are evaluated together, it may be considered that the regulator seeks to establish a framework that is both more flexible and, in certain respects, more sanction-oriented.

A key point that initially draws attention is the removal of the requirement that consumption facilities to be associated with a generation facility must be within the same tariff group. This explicit requirement under the previous regulation could be viewed as a limiting factor, particularly in cases where consumption facilities belonging to different subscriber groups were to be associated with a single generation facility. With the removal of this provision, it appears that the inclusion of consumption facilities under different tariff groups no longer constitutes a direct obstacle. This may be interpreted as enabling a more flexible structure, especially for bringing together commercial and industrial consumption under different subscription schemes.

However, the newly introduced provision does not transform this flexibility into an absolute freedom. On the contrary, a different criterion has been introduced requiring that consumption facilities associated with a generation facility must be within the same subscriber group. In this context, the replacement of the concept of “tariff group” with “subscriber group” may be considered to aim at establishing a clearer and more controllable distinction from both technical and commercial classification perspectives. Nevertheless, where the relevant facilities are not within the same subscriber group, it is understood that the energy generated during the relevant period is deemed to have been supplied to the system by the designated supplier company, no payment is made for such energy, and it is considered as a contribution provided without consideration to YEKDEM.

This approach may also be interpreted as constituting a de facto sanction mechanism. Indeed, even where the producer has technically generated energy, failure to comply with the prescribed association conditions results in the inability to obtain any economic return from such generation, and the energy is treated as a contribution provided without consideration to the system. In this respect, it may be considered that investors will need to pay closer attention to subscriber group criteria when structuring their facilities.

On the other hand, another significant provision that has been removed relates to the three-year period within which the acceptance procedures of generation facilities were required to be completed, as well as the rule that failure to comply with this period would render the connection agreement null and void. The removal of this provision may be interpreted as easing the time pressure on the investment process. Eliminating the rigid structure under which exceeding the prescribed period could result in the loss of connection rights, may provide greater flexibility in timing from the investor’s perspective.

That said, the removal of this provision should not necessarily be interpreted as meaning that discipline regarding timelines has been eliminated. It may be considered that the regulator prefers to manage this area through other regulations or secondary mechanisms. However, under the current text, the elimination of the risk that the connection agreement becomes automatically void due to the lapse of time may be regarded as a significant change in favour of investors.

When assessed as a whole, the amendments under Article 30 appear to produce a dual effect. On the one hand, a more flexible structure is introduced in terms of consumption–generation association; on the other hand, the boundaries of this flexibility are delineated through the subscriber group criterion and the economic consequences foreseen in cases of non-compliance. At the same time, by removing the time pressure related to the commissioning of facilities, a broader area of movement is provided within the investment process, while it may also be considered that different instruments may have been introduced to preserve the integrity of the system.

ARTICLE 31 – Audit

The amendment introduced under Article 31, although it may at first glance appear as a mere addition of a single phrase, may in fact be considered to indicate a significant expansion in terms of both the scope of the audit mechanism and the flow of data. With the inclusion of the term “market operator” in the text of the article, it is understood that the reports forming the basis for the review and audit of unlicensed generation activities may now be prepared not only by the network operator and the designated supplier company, but also by the market operator.

This development may be interpreted, particularly in the context of settlement, reconciliation and data verification processes where the market operator assumes a central role, as reflecting a shift from an indirect to a more institutionalized involvement of the market operator in the audit process. In other words, it appears that the measurement, data processing and settlement outputs held by the market operator may now be more directly utilized within the audit activities conducted by the Authority.

ARTICLE 33 – Collection and Retention of Information

A review of Article 33 suggests that the amendments have been structured in a coherent and systematic manner around the strengthening of data governance and the expanded role of the market operator. When the additions and repealed provisions are considered together, it may be said that the regulator has adopted an approach aimed at centralizing data flows while redistributing responsibilities among relevant actors.

The explicit reference to the market operator in the first paragraph makes it clear that persons engaged in unlicensed electricity generation are now required to submit data and documentation not only to the Authority, the network operator, and the designated supplier company, but also directly to the market operator. This addition indicates that the market operator’s role is no longer confined to settlement and market operation functions but may extend to a broader capacity as a data collector and processor. Such a development could be expected to contribute positively to data integrity and transparency.

The amendment to the second paragraph appears to reflect a more fundamental structural shift. The previous framework, under which network operators submitted data directly to the Authority, has been replaced with a market operator–centric data architecture. Under the new approach, data relating to unlicensed generation facilities are to be stored in a database established by the market operator, with network operators responsible for entering such data into the system in a prescribed format. The responsibility for organizing and transmitting this data to the Authority has likewise been assigned to the market operator. While this model may represent a significant step forward in terms of data standardization and consolidation, it may also introduce a degree of dependency on a single institution within the data flow.

With the amendment to the fourth paragraph, the scope of the data retention obligation has been broadened, and the market operator has been explicitly included among the parties subject to this obligation. Whereas the previous framework limited data retention responsibilities to network operators and designated supplier companies, the inclusion of the market operator may be seen as reflecting an intention to establish a more comprehensive structure in terms of data security and continuity.

The fifth and sixth paragraphs indicate that the data notification obligations of distribution companies and holders of OSB distribution licenses are now directed both to TEİAŞ and to the market operator. In particular, the addition of a notification requirement vis-à-vis the market operator in the sixth paragraph suggests that information relating to connection processes is also intended to be integrated into a centralized data structure. This development may enable closer monitoring of the unlicensed generation portfolio.

The seventh paragraph provides that information regarding generation facilities approaching the end of their economic life; namely, those with two months or less remaining until the completion of the ten-year period, must be notified to the market operator, which is then required to publish these facilities in list form. This arrangement may enhance predictability for market participants and allow for more transparent tracking of capacity expected to exit the system.

Overall, the amendments introduced under Article 33 appear to centralize data collection, processing, storage, and reporting functions to a significant extent around the market operator. While this approach may yield positive outcomes in terms of data quality and market transparency, it remains to be seen, in practice, whether the concentration of data flows within a single institution could give rise to operational risks over time.

ARTICLE 35 – Transfer of Generation Facility

Upon reviewing the third paragraph introduced under Article 35, it appears that the regulator has adopted an approach aimed at preserving the consumption–generation relationship and maintaining the balance logic existing at the time of application, particularly within the context of generation facility transfer processes.

With the introduction of this paragraph, it is stipulated that, in the event of a transfer of a generation facility, the new consumption facilities to be associated with such facility must satisfy certain conditions. In this context, it is primarily required that the new consumption facility complies with the legal framework applicable as of the date of the initial application of the generation facility. This may be understood as an attempt to prevent the utilization of more flexible or advantageous regulatory provisions introduced at a later stage through transfer transactions. In other words, it may be suggested that the regulator has developed a reflex aimed at preserving the “regime at the time of application.”

In addition, under the provision set forth particularly in subparagraph (b), for generation facilities that have obtained a call letter within the scope of priority evaluation, it is required that the annual consumption of the newly associated consumption facility shall not be lower than the consumption amount declared in the original application. This provision appears to aim at preserving the “generation up to consumption” principle, which forms the basis of the unlicensed generation system, also in the post-transfer phase. Accordingly, it may be inferred that it is intended to prevent, through transfer, the pairing of a generation facility with a lower-consumption facility that could effectively result in surplus generation within the system.

When viewed in a broader context, the arrangements introduced under the third paragraph may be understood as seeking to ensure that transfer transactions within the unlicensed generation regime do not function merely as changes in ownership but are also subject to certain constraints designed to preserve technical and economic balance. That said, the practical effects of these constraints, particularly on secondary market activity and investor flexibility, remain to be seen in implementation.

ARTICLE 37 – Other Provisions

When the amendments introduced under Article 37 are considered as a whole, it may be observed that the regulator has intervened along three principal axes: the clarification of the boundaries of flexibility in installed capacity, the redefinition and narrowing of equipment standards, and the substantial strengthening and systematization of the sanctioning framework applicable to unauthorized or non-compliant installations.

The amendment introduced in the third paragraph may be understood as seeking to define the scope of installed capacity reduction in a more explicit and confined manner, particularly in connection with partial acceptance processes and the commissioning scenarios of generation facilities. In this context, while the possibility of a one-time capacity reduction of up to ten percent remains available to persons who have been granted a call letter. It appears that the types of facilities excluded from benefiting from this option have now been delineated with greater clarity. This approach may be regarded as an attempt to enhance predictability from a system planning perspective, while not eliminating flexibility during the project development phase.

A more notable amendment is introduced in the sixth paragraph. Under the previous framework, equipment was required, in a more general sense, to be “in compliance with the relevant legislation and standards, covered by warranty, and manufactured within the last five years.” The revised provision departs from this general formulation and instead adopts a more concrete and restrictive approach by specifying a defined list of core equipment, such as turbines, generators, blades, panels, inverters, boilers, motors, and batteries, while preserving the five-year requirement. This shift may be seen as enhancing the practical applicability of the regulation, while at the same time limiting interpretative ambiguity and providing a clearer framework for both the administration and market participants. That said, it may also be noted that discussions as to what qualifies as “core equipment” may not be eliminated. Furthermore, the restructuring of the exception regime and the explicit clarification that the five-year requirement will not apply to certain types of facilities suggest that the regulation has been calibrated in a manner that accommodates technical diversity.

The amendment to the thirteenth paragraph stands out as the most stringent and structurally significant intervention within the article. The sanctioning regime applicable to facilities installed and commissioned without authorization, previously set out in a single, consolidated provision, has now been divided into subparagraphs, thereby introducing a more systematic and categorical structure. A distinction is drawn between facilities that lack a connection agreement call letter or a connection agreement, and those that, despite having obtained such documentation, are commissioned in breach of the applicable procedures. While disconnection from the grid is envisaged in both scenarios, more onerous obligations, such as the dismantling of equipment and the physical removal of the facility, are explicitly imposed for the first category.

In addition, it appears that the restriction preventing natural and legal persons who have carried out unauthorized installations from submitting a new application for a period of three years has been retained and continues to be applied in a systematic manner. The revised provision further stipulates that, in certain cases, the amount to be assessed by the network operator shall be calculated based on a specific formula and treated as “unauthorized electricity consumption revenue.” This formula, based on parameters such as installed capacity, capacity utilization rate, and the applicable energy tariff for the relevant subscriber group, may be understood as aiming to render the sanction more measurable and standardized. Moreover, the provision requiring that the assessed amount be doubled in cases of continued non-compliance may be regarded as significantly reinforcing the deterrent effect of the sanctioning framework.

Overall, the amendments introduced under Article 37 may be seen as reflecting an effort to establish a stricter, more measurable, and progressively structured sanctioning regime within the unlicensed generation framework, particularly in relation to practices such as unauthorized installations and commissioning in breach of regulatory requirements. That said, the practical implications of these measures, especially in relation to existing projects and ongoing investments, may give rise to outcomes that merit close monitoring from the perspective of market participants.

ANNEX-2 and ANNEX-3

When Additional Article 2 and Additional Article 3 are assessed together, the regulator appears to have expanded the unlicensed generation regime along two critical axes: the integration of aggregation activities into unlicensed generation portfolios, and the establishment of a clearer and more restrictive framework governing the relationship between storage and unlicensed generation.

With respect to Additional Article 2, although the amendment appears concise in form, it signals a structurally significant expansion in its practical implications. Under this provision, it is expressly stipulated that the duties, powers, and responsibilities assigned under the Regulation to incumbent suppliers shall, save for a specific exemption, also apply to aggregators that include unlicensed generation facilities within their portfolios. This approach may be interpreted as an effort to position aggregation not merely as a commercial intermediation function, but as a market role that also entails regulatory obligations. Subjecting aggregators to a similar set of obligations as incumbent suppliers in certain respects may be seen as a development that could lead to a convergence of roles and responsibilities within the market. That said, the exemption set out under Article 24/4 indicates that the regulator has not framed this expansion as an open-ended delegation of authority, but rather as a calibrated and controlled adjustment.

Additional Article 3, by contrast, establishes a more explicit and technically grounded framework for the role of storage within the unlicensed generation system. In the first paragraph, the installation of an integrated storage unit within an unlicensed generation facility is permitted; however, this permission is limited by the electrical capacity of the generation facility. This limitation may be understood as aiming to ensure that storage remains ancillary to the generation activity and does not evolve into an independent commercial generation instrument. At the same time, the explicit reference to a separate regulation governing storage activities reflects a deliberate effort to maintain regulatory coherence within the broader legislative framework.

The provision introduced in the second paragraph reflects a particularly critical policy choice in terms of the economic treatment of storage activities. Accordingly, where the energy injected into the grid from the storage unit is considered within the scope of surplus energy arising after netting, it is explicitly stipulated that no payment shall be made for such energy. Furthermore, in cases where the energy supplied from storage cannot be separately identified, it is envisaged that no payment shall be made for the entirety of the surplus energy. This approach may be understood as aiming to limit the possibility of generating systematic revenue through storage and to position storage primarily as a tool for consumption optimization and system balancing. In addition, the fact that such energy is deemed to have been generated by the incumbent supplier and counted as a contribution provided without consideration to the YEKDEM mechanism may be considered to have financial implications the producer.

The third paragraph introduces a tolerance margin of ten percent in the acceptance processes of storage units. This provision may be regarded as a practical arrangement intended to accommodate potential deviations that may arise in technical implementation. However, the scope of this tolerance and the way it will be applied may give rise to areas open to interpretation, particularly in field-level applications.

From an overall perspective, Additional Article 2 appears to facilitate a stronger integration of aggregation activities into the unlicensed generation regime, while Additional Article 3 introduces economic constraints on such activities. When read together, these two provisions may suggest that the regulator is, on the one hand, seeking to incorporate new market mechanisms into the system, while on the other adopting a cautious approach aimed at preventing these mechanisms from evolving into uncontrolled revenue models.

PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 5

When the amendments introduced under Provisional Article 5 are considered as a whole, the regulation appears to have been restructured primarily around updating the approach to the legislative framework governing unlicensed generation facilities of OSB distribution license holders, the measurement points through which such facilities are connected, and the applicable netting period.

With respect to the first paragraph, it is observed that the previous reference to Article 14 of the OSB Electricity Market Regulation, published in the Official Gazette dated 14 March 2014 and numbered 28941, has been removed. In its place, an explicit reference has been introduced to the “Regulation on the Electricity Market Activities of Organized Industrial Zones and Industrial Zones,” published in the Official Gazette dated 25 July 2024 and numbered 32612, and to Article 10 thereof. This amendment may be understood as seeking to discontinue the linkage established under the former OSB legislation and to ensure alignment with the current and updated regulatory framework. At the same time, the express inclusion of the term “Industrial Zones” suggests that the scope is no longer limited to OSBs but has been broadened to cover a wider definition of industrial areas. Within this framework, it appears that the determination of the connection points and meters through which unlicensed generation facilities will be associated has been aligned with the systematics set out under the new regulation.

The amendment introduced in the third paragraph, while technical in nature, appears to signal a shift that could have notable practical implications. The previous “hourly or monthly” netting approach has been simplified so that only “hourly” netting is retained, thereby eliminating alternative netting periods and establishing a single, more standardized framework. While this change may limit the flexibility previously available in application areas operating under different measurement and settlement infrastructures, it may also be seen as steering the system toward a more real-time data flow, enhanced traceability, and a more centralized calculation structure. In this context, adopting hourly netting as the principal basis enables the production-consumption balance to be monitored over shorter time intervals, while at the same time potentially reducing the balancing effects that could previously be achieved over longer periods. Accordingly, although the amendment may be characterized as a technical simplification, it may also be interpreted in practice as a preference for standardization and real-time balancing rather than flexibility.

PROVISIONAL ARTICLE 13

Provisional Article 13 sets out a transitional framework that clearly defines the shift towards a more centralised structure for netting and data management within the unlicensed generation regime. In this respect, the provision goes beyond establishing a purely technical timeline and may also be read as signalling a broader transformation in the overall system architecture.

Under the provision, it is foreseen that the database envisaged under Article 33, together with the infrastructure required for the netting processes to be carried out pursuant to Article 26, will be established by the market operator by 1 May 2026. This approach may be understood as aiming to consolidate currently fragmented data structures and processes under a more integrated and centralised system. In particular, the establishment of the database within the market operator’s structure may be seen as a development that could have notable implications in terms of the standardisation, traceability and auditability of data flows.

At the same time, the provision explicitly regulates the regime that will apply until this date. Accordingly, until the relevant infrastructure is commissioned by the market operator, the netting processes falling within the scope of the relevant provisions will continue to be carried out monthly by the market operator, the relevant network operators and the designated supply companies. This appears to be intended to avoid any systemic gap and to ensure continuity in the functioning of the existing system throughout the transition period.

In this context, the retention of the “monthly netting” approach is particularly notable, as it suggests a preference for a simpler and more manageable method during the interim period. This may also be read as an indication that, once the necessary infrastructure is completed, a transition towards hourly-based netting models could be envisaged.

Overall, Provisional Article 13 appears to introduce a structured transition towards the centralisation, digitalisation and standardisation of data management and netting processes in the unlicensed generation market. That said, the extent to which the infrastructure will be completed by 1 May 2026, and how smoothly the transition will unfold in practice, are likely to remain key points of attention for market participants.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

Within this framework, the 2026 amendments may be viewed not merely as a technical revision, but rather as part of a broader regulatory recalibration aimed at redefining the scope, boundaries and operational logic of the unlicensed generation model. At the same time, it remains clear that the ultimate impact of these changes will become more apparent over time, depending on how implementation details evolve, how effectively market participants are able to adapt, and how secondary legislation and practical application shape the framework. For this reason, any assessments made at this stage may need to be revisited as the process continues to develop.

When considered together with the article-by-article analysis, it can be observed that the regulator appears to be seeking, on the one hand, to reinforce systemic coherence and, on the other, to reshape the netting mechanism into a structure that is more controllable, traceable and standardised. However, how this approach will play out in practice and what kind of outcomes it may produce, particularly for facilities with differing consumption profiles and varying technical infrastructures, will likely become clearer in the period ahead.

On the other hand, initial reactions and evaluations emerging from the sector suggest that the amendments have triggered discussions concentrated around certain key themes. While these critiques appear to be largely grounded in technical, economic and legal considerations, a comprehensive assessment of these debates would require a separate and more focused analysis. Accordingly, the sectoral feedback, the main areas of contention, and the potential evolution of the regulatory approach in this context will be addressed in detail in a separate piece.

@Zeynep EMİROĞLU